The report is a good explanation of not only the 2010 Revolution, but also a survey of Kyrgyz politics from independence to 2016 (when the report was published). Its explanation of the violence in 2010, however, is partial and does not reflect any original research into responsibility for the conflicts in either North or South, i.e., we still don't know who organized the violence. This is probably not the author's fault and just reflects the difficulty and danger of investigating this topic in the Kyrgyz Republic. The core point of the report is that, while politics following the 2010 Revolution have been more consistent and seen a peaceful transition of power, the fundamental problems that caused the Tulip Revolution and the 2010 Revolution remain the same and are still unresolved; if anything, the divides between Uzbek-Kyrgyz and North-South divides are getting worst. The most significant policy changes have been a stronger alignment toward Russia and the reduction of presidential power, although the proper balance of power between parliament and the president was not conclusively decided after the 2010 Revolution, explaining why the presidential system was so readily readopted under President Sadyr Japarov in 2021.
— Eunice Noh, March 2022
The background to the conflict is that, in 1991, the Kyrgyz Republic emerged as the 'Switzerland of Central Asia', seemingly stable and dedicated to democratic reforms. However, the reforms of this period were flawed and exacerbated societal divisions, particularly between North and South and between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. A new constitution was promulgated in 1993, but immediately found to be flawed and rival factions argued over the constitutional order as politics reached gridlock and corruption proliferated. There were hopes that this would all go away in March 2005, when mass protests forced President Aksar Akayev to leave the country and Kurmanbek Bakiev was elected president, but his regime was also corrupt and plagued by elite infighting. By 2009, the Bakiev government was in serious trouble: the global financial crisis had trashed the economy, particularly by reducing the global price of gold; everyone was angry about price hikes initiated in 2010; and Bakiev's corruption around airbases had alienated both the USA and Russia. Bakiev was overthrown later that year, in events covered by the rest of the report (5-7).
Part I: Context
Socio economic factors:
President Askar Akayev was a true glasnost figure who did care about rapidly transitioning from a Soviet dictatorship to a multiparty democracy. These reforms, however, were sloppy: there was a new constitution in 1993, but it was found faulty in 1994, so the whole parliament was dissolved and Akayev ruled by degree until it could be replaced with a bicameral parliament in 1995. The Kyrgyz Republic then began constantly changing the constitution, all without actually solving the problems of the country, and many politicians just focused on being corrupt. Politics often focused on being able to gather a coalition based on corrupt dealings, bribes, and personal networks.
Economic reforms to become a market economy also faltered. The Kyrgyz Republic left the ruble zone to adopt its own national currency in 1993 and asceded to the WTO in 1998. The immediate effects of these moves was that trade with ruble-zone countries collapsed, cost of living soared, and cheap imports wiped out the domestic manufacturing base, causing a deep economic recession. The privatization or breaking up of collectivized farms, particularly livestock farms, denied most Kyrgyz farmers and herders access to basic agricultural inputs or services, prompting a mass killing of unsustainable livestock and the movement of impoverished rural populations to the cities. Any social services, including access to good education, that had existed under the USSR was gutted. The country lacked the infrastructure to be internationally competitive and the government did not invest in building up road, rail, and communications networks. The economic collapse just continued as the Kyrgyz Republic became import dependent, poor, and extremely indebted.
The economic crisis and growing corruption of society in the late 1980s onward fed into disaffection among the youth and a rise in crime, particularly as youth fell into poverty without social institutions. The Kyrgyz prison system was brutal and prisoners joined gangs as a way to survive. Most criminal gangs focused on drug trafficking from Afghanistan, which was already a problem in 1992 but exploded after the fall of the Taliban government in 2001. Gangs became more serious and heroin addiction began a problem in the country. Many gang bosses and their rackets were protected by politicians. Corruption exploded during this time, assisted by the linkage between public position and private wealth created during privatization. There was a general perception that all of society was corrupt and no one in power could be trusted.
Islamic revival began in the country under glasnost and the government at first welcomed religious freedom, but began to become concerned about extremism and imposed controls on religious activities through the Muftiate in 1993. Many considered extreme salafi groups, like Hizb ut Tahrir, to be linked to jihadist organizations like the O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakati, which had a presence in the country. Kyrgyz policy on religion was a delicate balance between concerns about radical Islamist and pressure from Western states to preserve religious freedom.
The favorativism shown to the nominal ethnicity, the Kyrgyz, increased following independence. Although ethnic Russians were comforted by Russian being retained as an official language, ethnic Uzbeks were given no similar concession. While the upper house of parliament, created in 1995, was meant to address this issue, it failed and Uzbek issues were ignored. This was particularly bad under President Bakiev, who was a Kyrgyz chauvanist. A pivotal moment was in 2006, when Uzbek representative Kadyrjan Batyrov was prevented from speaking, after which he decided to try to provide Uzbek services outside of the state. The marginalization of Uzbeks was combined with a bad economic situation in the South, with the collapse of agricultural economies causing mainly Kyrgyz ruralites to become squatters in mainly Uzbek cities, creating a widespread jealousy of Uzbek wealth among rural Kyrgyz migrants.
The Kyrgyz Republic always had a north south divide, as the country is physically divided by the Tian Shan mountains. This got worst after independence because the only major highway going north-south, the Bishkek-Osh Highway, fell into disrepair and got so bad most people only used air travel to cross the mountains. The divide was cultural, in that the North was more Kyrgyz with Russian cities and more international connections, whereas the South was an agrarian backwater with large ethnic minorities, particularly Uzbeks.
In March 2005, in the 'Tulip Revolution', crowds angry at alleged vote rigging in parliamentary elections flooded the streets and demanded that President Akayev resign, which he did. The hope was that the troika of revolutionary leaders, Kurmanbek Bakiev, Roza Otunbayeva, and Felix Kulov, would clean house and end corruption. Kurmanbek Bakiev quickly sidelined the other leaders, became president, and then alienated everyone by being extremely corrupt and persecuting his political enemies.
A conflicted society:
Violence erupted in Osh, specifically in that city and the nearby towns of Uzgen and Kara Suu, in the spring and summer of 1990. The underlying factor was that, during the collapse of the agricultural economy, many Kyrgyz had come to these cities seeking work only to be frustrated that Uzbeks owned the good farmland and dominated commerce. This rage at the economic position of the Uzbeks combined with nationalism under the Kyrgyz nationalist group 'Osh Aimagi'. Uzbeks, for their part, were underrepresented in government and felt the sting of Kyrgyz nationalism as Uzbek language education and publications were reduced. Many left for the Uzbek SSR, the Uzbek nationalist group 'Adolat' wanted the area to join the Uzbek SSR, and the Uzbek community elders of Osh submitted a petition on 2 March 1990 to be granted autonomous status within the Kyrgyz SSR. Conflict began in June after a decision by the Kyrgyz-dominated local government to give a plot of prime land to landless Kyrgyz and following the expulsion of Kyrgyz tenants by Uzbek landlords. Brutal riots broke out on 4 June 1990. The riots were only repressed by the Soviet army and Interior Ministry soldiers, with deaths in the hundreds and millions of rubles in damage.
In late August 1999, several hundred armed men, allegedly militants of the O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakat, appeared in Batken province, Kyrgyz Republic, likely having been ejected from Tajikistan. It is unclear who exactly they were or what they wanted, but they had been able to cross the border because Russian border guards had withdrawn in 1999. There was another crossing in August 2000, which was driven out of Uzbekistan in September and from the Kyrgyz Republic in October 2000. These incidents, for which Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine offered aid through the CIS, convinced the Kyrgyz Republic to enhance its cooperation with CIS nations on counter-terrorist activities.
Large public protests occured in March 2002 in response to parliament agreeing to ratify a 1999 treaty with China that deliminated the border, giving around 30% of the disputed territory to the Chinese. This anger Kyrgyz nationalists, particularly in the more intensely nationalist South, and highlighted the general corruption of government. Protests started in Aksy, in the Jalalabad region, demanding the release of local politician Azimbek Beknazarov, who had campaigned against the border treaty and been arrested in January 2002. On 17 March, police fired into the crowd, killing 6 and injuring 62. Beknazarov was released, but protests continued and spread across the country, especially the South. This led opposition parties to band together as the 'Movement for the Resignation of President Akayev' in August 2002, which led a march on the capitol in September 2002. The march was stopped when the government gave assurances it would punish those responsible for the murder of civilians in Aksy. It didn't punish anyone and continued to prosecute opposition figures, including former vice president and head of the opposition party Ar Namys, Felix Kulov.
In 2005, the bicameral parliament was again replaced with a unicameral parliament, the elections to which were messed up pretty badly. Protests occured after these elections, especially in the South. The protests turned into riots directed at government buildings in Jalalabad in March 2005 and spread to Bishkek. There was widespread rioting and looting, but no major ethnic conflicts during the 2005 Tulip Revolution, which was possibly inspired by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004. President Askar Akayev fled the country 'temporarily', and order was partially restored when former prime minister and opposition leader Kurmanbek Bakiev was declared provisional president until elections were held and Felix Kulov was released from prison and put in charge of the security services. It looked like there might be more drama in April 2005, because Kulov, a Northern, announced his intention to run for president against Bakiev, a Southerner, but this was resolved when Kulov withdrew his candidacy in exchange for the promise of being appointed prime minister. Bakiev was elected president in a 90% landslide on 10 July 2005 and did appointed Kulov prime minister, but there were now tensions between the two figures, two parliamentarians were murdered in the fall of 2005 under suspicious circumstances, Bakiev quickly became subject to allegations of corruption, and there were major protests in Bishkek both for and against Kulov; in the fall of 2005, things already did not look good.
Geopolitical trends 1992-2010:
During the 1990s and 2000s, the Kyrgyz Republic was involved with regional initiatives backed by Russia, China, NATO, Turkey, and Iran. It also was subject to influence from its neighbors. All of this fed into conspiracy theories.
The Kyrgyz Republic's relationship with Uzbekistan was the most difficult because the two shared a massive border, transport infrastructure, and water resources. There were a number of disputes between the now independent republics over border regulations and organized crime, energy supplies, and, most importantly water. The Kyrgyz wanted to constructed larger hydroelectric dams for power, but this would deprive water from Uzbekistani farmers and be bad for the environment. The situation got worst after the Batken incident in 1999, as Uzbekistan considered the Kyrgyz Republic to be unstable and instituted a tougher border regime. Uzbekistan was also involved in the internal matters of Russian and US bases in the Kyrgyz Republic, as Uzbekistan wanted to keep NATO and the USA in the region, fearing Russian domination and believing that a US presence was necessary for peace in Afghanistan.
The Kyrgyz establishment was heavily pro-USA and wanted an American presence in the region. So, when the USA invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the Kyrgyz happily offered the use of Manas Airbase near Bishkek as a logistics hub. By 2005, public opinion had turned against the USA largely because of the fact that President Akayev had accepted an insanely low rent for the base, which he only eventually got revised; there was huge corruption surrounding the supply of the base; and it was very noisy. There were rumors that the USA was also going to use the base to station AWACS to spy on others an people hoped that the SCO or Russia would help them get the USA out. In February 2009, the parliament voted for the Manas base to be closed and for the USA to leave the country, shortly after the government had concluded a very lucrative investment deal with Russia. However, Bakiev used this as pressure on the USA for more money and assistance and extended the lease, at a much higher rent, for a year in June 2009.
In the 1990s, Russia was in too much disarray to have a coherent policy towards Central Asia, but this changed when Vladimir Putin was elected in 2000. Putin actively reached out to the Kyrgyz Republic, including opening an airbase at Kant under the framework of the CSTO. The Russia presence was broadly favorable, as people liked the Russians and, unlikely the US base at Manas, the Kant base was seen as contributing to the local economy. There were issues with the base, and other Russian facilities, in August 2009, as Uzbekistan objected to the Russian presence and warned that it increased the militarization of the region. Some of the recent expansions were also abruptly cancelled by Bakiev as he received more lucrative US counterproposals.
Chinese relations with the Kyrgyz Republic was mainly informal and commercial, as the Kyrgyz Republic became a distributor of Chinese goods throughout Central Asia, and distrust for China was high in the 1990s and early 2000s. These relations expanded after 2002 within the context of the SCO and anti-terror exercises. This was followed by promises of Chinese military assistance and Chinese investment. There were also tensions in the late 2000s over Chinese treatment of Uyghurs, as there were some 5k Uyghurs living in the Kyrgyz Republic, many of them with family in China.
Part II: Conflict
Coming into his second term following reelection in July 2009, Bakiev was tarnished with corruption scandals but was still a powerful figure and had managed to reduce the poverty level, particularly in the South. Bakiev began his second term by introducing radical reforms, which he claimed were to reduce corruption and get shit down, but were also viewed as a power grab. In October 2009, Bakiev reduced the number of ministries and brought state agency under direct federal control, prompting Prime Minister Igor Chudinov to resign, followed by the rest of the Kyrgyz government. The pro-government Ak Jol party still held the majority in parliament, so they nominated Bakiev's Chief of Staff, Daniar Usenov as PM and Bakiev continued his reforms. The most contraversial reform was massive price hikes in public utilities — heating by 400%, electricity by 170%, hot water by 300% — to be implemented in January and July 2010.
Large protests against President Bakiev were organized when the price hikes were introduced in January 2010. They increased in size when prices increased further in April 2010 when Russia increased tarriffs on fuel exports to the Kyrgyz Republic. The revolutionary violence began on 6 April 2010, when, the day after an opposition politicians had been detained in Talas, looting and arson broke out in Bishkek and Talas. Protests got larger on 7 April, several people were killed and government buildings were torched or ransacked; crowds were dispersed with live fire from police, killing dozens. President Bakiev fled from Bishkek to the South and an interim government was set up in Bishkek, headed by Roza Otunbayeva on 8 April 2010. The new interim government imposed curfews in Bishkek, Talas, and Naryn. President Bakiev officially resigned on 16 April and left first for Kazakhstan and then Belarus. Several officials linked to Bakiev were arrested, including his brother Janybek, who was accused of ordering police to fire on the crowd. Members of the muftiate were attacked and Mufi Jumanov was kidnapped for several days.
Bakiev still retained some support in the South and, on 13 May, his supporters attacked government buildings in Jalalabad and expelled the governor. The following day, armed Uzbeks clashed with these majority-Kyrgyz crowds and restored the governor before marching to Bakiev's ancestral village and burning down the houses of his extended family. The Uzbek community, including the influential Kadyrjan Batyrov had decided to support the interim government against Bakiev. In response to the Uzbeks picking sides, pro-Bakiev forces attacked the Uzbek language Peoples Friendship University that Batyrov had founded in 1999, a prominent Uzbek cultural institution, and burned it down, preventing firefighters from reaching the site. Later, hearing that someone had issued a warrant for his arrest, Batyrov fled the country. Clashes between pro- and anti-Bakiev forces continued in the South throughout May.
In the region around Osh, Bazarkorgon, and Aravan experienced open ethnic violence beginning in June 2010 with a brawl between Kyrgyz and Uzbek youths at a casino in Osh on 9 June, likely in connection to the murder of Bakiev-linked drugrunner and mob boss Oybek "Qora" Mirsidikov on 7 June. This fight instantly exploded in massive race riots, involving murder, torture, rape, and arson; property and districts were marked 'Uzbek' or 'Kyrgyz' to identify targets in the riots. Kyrgyz police failed to stop and sometimes participated in attacks on Uzbeks. Reports indicate that the main perpetrators appear to have been organized and given masks and armbands. The violence displaced around 400k people, mainly women, children, and the elderly, around 100k of whom fled to Uzbekistan. On 12 June 2010, the interim government issued an emergency degree deploying the army to the area and permitting the use of deadly force. Large scale riots were dispersed by 14 June, but emergency law remained in effect until the end of the month and attacks on Uzbeks and police abuse continued in the following months.
External responses
The response to the violence in the Kyrgyz Republic was rapid, particularly that organized by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. With the exception of one Pakistani student at Osh State University, there were no attacks on foreigners. None of the regional organizations in which the Kyrgyz Republic was a member responded to the crisis in the Kyrgyz Republic: the CSTO refused to participate, as Belarus and Uzbekistan vetoed any intervention; the SCO did not receive a request for intervention; the OSCE assisted for Bakiev's safe and peaceful departure from the country, but did not deploy its own forces even when requested by Otunbayeva because of the objections of Osh's mayor.
Despite both countries have military bases in the country, neither the USA nor Russia intervened in the internal crisis in the Kyrgyz Republic; both were scared of instability, wanted a return to order, and had no desire to get involved in the mess. China was even less inclined to get involved. Uzbekistan behaved responsibly and cautiously to prevent the spread of ethnic violence, closing its border in early April 2010 and keeping it closed until mid-June 2010, after the ethnic violence had passed, briefly opening borders to accomodate refugees. Uzbekistan requested and received international assistance in caring for these refugees and repatriating nearly all of them on and after 27 June 2010, in cooperation with international organizations and the Kyrgyz interim government. Uzbekistan's position was extremely important in preventing angry Uzbeks from launching raids across the border against Kyrgyz communities. Kazakhstan also closed its borders with the Kyrgyz Republic in April 2010, caused an economic crisis due to the country's important position as a trade hub for Kyrgyz merchants selling Chinese goods to Russian buyers. In retaliation, the Kyrgyz interim government blocked several cross-border irrigation canals during an important part in the Kazakhstani growing season, convincing the Kazakhstani government to reopen the border, although restrictions remained in place until late July 2010 and there were a number of shooting incidents.
Overall, the violence in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2010 resulted in 100k refugees and 300k internally displaced persons, an estimated 1,900 casualties, and between 470 (the official number) and around 2,000 deaths. Around 2,800 buildings were completed destroyed and 200 were severely damaged. There was $71 million in commercial damage, but the destruction of trees for use in barricades and knock-off effects of economic distruption meant that reconstruction would cost around $450 to $500 million. Commercial businesses were disrupted, causing shortfalls in government revenue; foreigners, including students and the foreign business community, were scared away; and relations between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in the Kyrgyz Republic were damaged.
Part III: Analysis
The first phase of the conflict in the Kyrgyz Republic was intra-Kyrgyz and focused in Bishkek and the North. It included both a political element of anti-government protest and a criminal element of looting and violent attacks on specific targets. These two elements combined, with criminal elements hiding themselves within the political protests. The second phase of the conflict was in the South and between the Uzbek community of the Kyrgyz Republic, which generally supported the interim government, and Southern Kyrgyz, who generally supported President Bakiev, who was a Southern and whose family and cronies held many important positions across the South. In the South, this political conflict assumed an overtly ethnic character. The interim government responded to the ethnic violence in the South by positioning themselves on the side of the ethnic Kyrgyz against the Uzbeks, despite the political support they received from the ethnic Uzbek community of the South, by issuing a warrant for the arrest of Batyrov on 19 May 2010. The last stage of conflict, around Osh, was purely ethnic, without political overtones, involved planning for violence by both sides, and saw Kyrgyz state authorities siding with pogromists against the Uzbek community. In all stages of the conflict, criminal attacks were mixed with the political or ethnic conflict.
Despite attempts to present the 2010 Revolution as a national struggle to oust a corrupt dictator, examination of the events of 2010 clearly shows that it was a spontaneous eruption of anger and frustration. While the first stage of the conflict, concentrated in the North, was politically, it was uncoordinated and no opposition figure seemed to be in control of events. The crowds had no common political platform and were only united by anger and opposition to President Bakiev. The new interim government was not composed of prominent opposition figures or anyone who had organized protests, but politicians who established some form of order during the chaos and were grudgingly accepted.
The problems that resulted in the overthrow of the Bakiev government were essentially the same as those that resulted in the ousting of Akayev in 2005: corruption and incompetence. It became clear that people were becoming less tolerant and forgiving of these faults. It took until the early 2000s for people to start getting really mad about Akayev's corruption, it took less than a year for people to start complaining about Bakiev, and accusations began being levelled against the interim government by May 2010. The reputation of the interim government was also hurt by the defection of some senior members, who complained that the new government had many of the same problems as Bakiev's government.
There were two main conspiracy theories popular among Kyrgyz as explanations for the 2010 violence: Russia-US rivalry and a shadowy 'third force'. The US-Russia narrative said that Bakiev was being punished by Russia for his pro-US stance. This 'Russia overthrew Bakiev' conspiracy theory was supported by the USA's blind eye toward President Bakiev's blatant corruption and misuse of Western aid and funds, seemingly showing that the USA propped up Bakiev. The USA was also blamed for a series of attacks on Russian journalists in the Kyrgyz Republic who were writing stories about the US funding 'color revolutions'. Moreover, Russian price hikes were responsible for higher fuel prices in the Kyrgyz Republic, fueling protests. This conspiracy fails to stand up to scrutiny, as, although Russia was certainly pissed off at Bakiev and allowed Russian media to openly criticize his corruption after March 2010, nobody seemed to consider Bakiev to be a reliable US ally or at risk of becoming one. Moreover, many of the politicians who replaced Bakiev, including Roza Otunbayeva, Ismail Isakov, and Omurbek Tekebayev, were pro-US. The Russian tariffs introduced in April 2010 are also better explained by the Kyrgyz decision to remain outside the customs union established by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in 2010. This was also a period of low tensions between the USA and Russia, characterized by 'New START', and neither country seems to have believed the other was responsible for or benefited from the coup in the Kyrgyz Republic.
The 'third force' conspiracy theories, which have become much more popular than 'Russia did it' as time goes on, say that the violence must have been orchestrated by someone. Candidates for that someone include: Bakiev loyalists, radical Islamists, and criminal gangs. Of these, Islamists are the least likely and criminal gangs were definitely involved, although there is no evidence that they were organized. Ethnic tensions were also blamed, but there is no clear narrative here, as the Uzbek community had no history of opposition to Bakiev, was initially supportive of the interim government, and actual began to be sympathetic to Bakiev again after Batyrov was forced into exile. Overall, the 'third force' conspiracy theory ignores the fact that almost all the violence was commited by local youths. Whether local youth were paid to commit violence is less relevant than the fact that thousands of people, especially in the South, were eager to commit violence.
The violence in the Southern Krygyz Republic revealed the shallowness of civil society in the Kyrgyz Republic, despite it having the most NGOs in Central Asia, nearly 4k in the late 1990s. Most of the large NGOs were either state-funded and used to give patronage to regime allies and family members or were funded and staffed by foreigners without local roots. Truly local NGOs existed, but were usually small, poorly funded, and badly run. None of these NGOs was in a position to organize against ethnic violence in the South. The press also remained subject to certain constraints on its activities, preventing active reporting, and generally had a pro-Kyrgyz slant. The most important element of civil society in the South turned out to be mahalla authorities and oqsaqals, as neighbors helped each other survive violence and oqsaqals of both communities tried to talk to young gangs of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and convince them to stop the violence.
Responsibility for maintaining public order lay with the army and the police forces of the Ministry of the Interior. The army is dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz and its lower ranks are conscripts doing a year's service. Both the army and police force were corrupt, poorly paid, poorly trained, and ineffective. The security forces were incapable of maintaining order in either the North or the South, but in the South there was the additional problem of police participating in violent attacks on Uzbeks. The security vacuum was filled by militias of civilians; these started as neighborhood defense groups, but expanded to provide broader public security and, by May 2010, the Meken ('Patriot') militia was guarding the area around Parliament. The interim government recognize these militias and gave them official legal status on 12 June 2010.
Several official reports about the violence in 2010 were published in 2011, particularly focusing on the ethnic violence in the South. The major one, created at the request of Otunbayeva and chaired by the OSCE, was the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission. Its report released an important amount of information into the public sphere, although it admitted that any criminal investigation was entirely the responsibility of the state authorities. Although it tried to be clear of any political or ethnic bias, the report truthfully noted that Uzbeks were subject to unfair treatement by Kyrgyz state authorities; for this reason, it was criticized by the Kyrgyz parliament for being biased in favor of the Uzbek community. On 26 May 2011, the parliament rejected the report and declared its OSCE chair a persona non grata in the country. Further discussion of this violence in the Kyrgyz Republic is liable to result in prosecution for journalists and deportation of foreigners. Reactions to the report were so strong because Kyrgyz public opinion refused to acknowledge any discrimination against the Uzbeks and often held them responsible for the violence.
Part IV: Post-conflict trends
Politics in the Kyrgyz Republic started back up almost immediately, with the interim government holding a referendum on 27 June 2010 on changes to the constitutions reducing the power of the presidency. The following referendum passed and was broadly fair, although many Uzbeks did not participate due to fear in the community following the ethnic violence, and most voters interviewed did not seem to actually understand the substance of the referendum.
New elections were on 10 October 2010, which were broadly fair, but featured only 55% turnout and resulted in the election of 5 parties that were very difficult to distinguish and which lacked clear political platforms. It was clear that support for Bakiev was no longer a major political issue, as the largest party, Ata Jurt, a Kyrgyz nationalist party from the South, included many former Bakiev officials and did not seem to matter because the substance of politics was dividing up the spoils. In late December 2010, a coalition government was formed between the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, Ata Jurt, and Respublika. New presidential elections were held in October 2011 — point of interest here: the original 83 candidates included people of every background, including working people and the unemployed, really showing that any social strata felt qualified to run for president — and were won by former Prime Minister and leader of the Social Democrats, Almazbek Atambayev. Interim President Otunbayev stepped down, making the country's first peaceful transition of power.
The new Kyrgyz government of Atambayev immediately ran into problems, as the parliamentary government disagreed with reforms proposed by President Atambayev and resigned two days after his inauguration. A new coalition government formed in parliament a few weeks later, but also eventually fell apart. This internal disunity in parliament meant that nothing really got done. This lack of political cohesion was reflected in the huge number of political parties in the country, around 203 by 2015, most of which resulted from minor splits, were the vehicles of personal interests, and lacked any coherent platform. Corruption is a core part of the political system and, for larger parties, positions on the lists in the proportional representative electoral system are determined by bribes. There were hopes that corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic had stemmed from the concentration of power in the presidency and that the weaken of that position would result in good governance, but the corruption remained and more power held by parliament simply led to additional gridlock and a lack of any coherent policy.
Turnout remained low in the 2015 elections, corruption was rife, electoral fraud common, and the results were a parliament split between 7 parties, the largest being Ata Jurt, Respublika, and the Social Democrats. The election of parliament was followed by a series of resignations due to corruption allegations and criminal prosecutions, including of the prime minister. There was new concern after the resignation of the original prime minister and speaker of parliament led to the appointment of two Social Democrats to those positions, Sooronbai Jeenbekov as Prime Minister, and Chynybay Tursunbekov as Speaker. This led to concerns that the Social Democrats now held too much power and would ignore other parties.
The lack of any coherent policies meant that existing social tensions were not healed and only got worst, including North versus South and Kyrgyz versus ethnic minorities. In particular, Uzbeks were a more marginalized group following 2010, as Batyrov was in exile and other political leaders were in jail. Uzbek cultural and educational institutions were closed and the community lacked political representation, often under implicit threat of violence from the ethnic Kyrgyz community should they act uppity. This marginalization was criticized by the international community, although not by Uzbekistan, but the Kyrgyz government resisted this pressure and international pressure may have only exacerbated ethnic tensions.
Islam continues to increase the role in plays in public life in the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly among the young and Southerners. Compared to the early 2000s, the Kyrgyz Republic is more devoutly religious and more extremist Islamist groups are present in the country. This trend has not been seen as mainly positive among population, who warn of Islamization. The Muftiate, which has been frequent turnover due to corruption and changes of political fortune in parliament, has been placed in a difficult situation as it struggles to retain public credibility while also satisfying government demands to keep Islam under control. There were continued fears about radical Islamist groups organizing in the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly after 350 Kyrgyz joined ISIS in 2015 and may return to the country to carry out attacks.
Following the 2010 Revolution, the Kyrgyz Republic's international relations were generally more stable and positive, largely because Atambayev was a firmer and more reliable negotiating partner than Bakiev. Atambayev's stance was that the Manas airbase lease would be extended but had to close by July 2014, as its presence made the Kyrgyz Republic a target for Islamists, but that cooperation would continue with the US in other areas, although criticism about human rights was not well received.
Atambayev stressed the importance of the relationship with Russia, which improved as Russia's base leases were extended and Russia cancelled $500 million in Kyrgyz debt, and Russia expanded military cooperation with the Kyrgyz Republic and Gazprom acquired parts of the country's gas infrastructure. Although plans for a permanent Russian base in Osh were dropped, such a proposal was not opposed by Uzbekistan by 2015 and remains a possibility, as relations between Russia and Uzbekistan improved during this period. The Russian military presence in the Kyrgyz Republic has expanded, largely as a result of increased worries about radical Islamists infiltrating the country from Afghanistan. Conservative cultural attitudes also favored a pro-Russian stance, as the US was associated with gay rights, color revolutions, and other perceived threats to Kyrgyz society and government. Economic relations with Russia have strengthened since the Kyrgyz Republic's entry into the EEU in August 2015.
Relations with Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan were generally positive, while the relationship with Uzbekistan remained tense, as old problems related to disputed borders and the difficulty of regular border crossings into Uzbekistan's exclaves, reinforced by conspiracy theories peddled in the Kyrgyz Republic that Uzbekistan wanted to annex the southern Kyrgyz Republic. The Kyrgyz Republic also developed stronger ties with countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, particularly China. China became a major force in the Kyrgyz Republic in the 2010s, pushing for economic integration through the One Belt One Road program and political cooperation through the SCO's committment to fight the 'three evils' of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. One of the main Chinese projects, a railway from Kashgar to Andijan, passing through the southern Kyrgyz Republic, was controversial because it would only benefit the economy of the South and integrate its economy more with Uzbekistan, potentially exacerbating already high North-South tensions. India also expanded its role in the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly in the miltiary sphere through acquisition of former Soviet naval testing grounds and equipment at Issyk Kul; this military relationship with the Kyrgyz Republic also counterbalanced against Pakistan's military cooperation with Tajikistan. Japan had been one of the most important countries in the Kyrgyz Republic in the 1990s, but withdrew many of its programs and investments following the kidnapping of several Japanese geologists in Batken in 1999 and did not reextend these programs due to persistent instability until the 2010 Revolution, at which Japan restored its strong political relationship and investment. Korea significantly boosted its investment in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2011 in response to a Chinese decision to reduce exports of rare earths and sudden need to develop new supplies; other business relations also expanded significantly in the 2010s. Stronger ties were also forged with Middle Eastern countries, in particular Iran after the removal of the US base at Manas in 2015. Other prominent Middle Eastern countries were Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
There is a very nice timeline of the 2010 Revolution on page 126 to page 135.
There are biographic sketches of major political figures on pages 136 to 141. These are worth copying in full:
Askar Akayev: Born November10,1944, Chui Province, northern Kyrgyzstan. Aged 17 years old, began work in local factory; subsequently studied at the Leningrad Institute of Precision Mechanics and Optics, graduated with an honors degree in 1967; re-mained at the Institute until his return to Kyrgyzstan in 1977, where he continued his scientific career at the Frunze Polytechnic Institute. In 1989, became President of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences. On October27,1990,elected by the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet to serve as the country’s first president. Re-elected by popular vote twice (1995, 2000), but was increasingly unpopular. On March 24, 2005, in the wake of fierce protests and demonstrations throughout the country, he fled to Kazakhstan. Subsequently granted asylum in Russia; formally resigned on April4,2005.Thereafter resumed his academic career in Moscow.
Azimjon Askarov: Born 1951, Jalal-Abad province; Uzbek Kyrgyzstani. Studied arts and crafts in Tashkent, worked as a painter-decorator. Post-independence became a civil rights activist. In 2002 founded the group Vozdukh (“Air”) to monitor conditions in Kyr-gyz prisons, especially in southern Kyrgyzstan; publicized instances of police brutality. During the 2010 conflict,Askarov recorded killings and arson attacks, distributed videos to international media outlets. Arrested by the Kyrgyz author-ities on June15,2010; claims that he was beaten and tortured while in police cus-tody were denied by the authorities.He was later tried and handed down a life sentence. In prison, his health rapidly deteriorated. Numerous international or-ganizations took up his case, includingHuman Rights Watch,Reporters Without Borders,People In Need, theCommittee to Protect Journalists, and Amnesty International. In 2015, the United States conferred the 2014 Human Rights Defender Award on Askarov. In response, the Kyrgyz government terminated the 1993 agreement on cooperation with the United States.
Kurmanbek Bakiev: Born August 1, 1949, Jalal-Abad province. Graduated from electrical engineering faculty, Kuibyshev Polytechnic Institute, 1972;military service in Soviet army 1974-76. Thereafter returned to engineering; working mostly in southern Kyrgyz-stan. Began political career in CommunistParty in 1990, active in local politics in southern Kyrgyzstan 1995-97. Held senior administrative post in northern prov-ince of Chui 1997-2000; December 2000 to May 2002 served as Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan. In 2004, became chairman of the “People’s Movement of Kyrgyz-stan.”In July 2005, after ousting of Askar Akayev, Bakiev was elected President, gaining 89% of the vote. In 2007, he founded the party Ak Jol (“White Path”). Dur-ing his presidential tenure, family members held prominent positions in the gov-ernment and allegedly profited from lucrative commercial contracts. Forced from office in April 2010, granted asylum in Belarus, where he later acquired citizen-ship. In February 2013, Kyrgyz military court sentenced him in absentia to 24 years in prison, with confiscation of all his property. Some of his relations and close associates also received long sentences. The Kyrgyz government repeatedly called for the extradition of Bakiev and other individuals wanted on criminal charges, but as of mid-2016, the Belarusian leadership showed no sign of acceding to these requests.
Kadyrjon Batyrov: Born March 9, 1956, Jalal-Abad city; Uzbek-Kyrgyzstani. After military service in the Soviet army (1974-76), he worked in various enterprises in Kyrgyzstan, then entered the Andijan (Uzbekistan) Institute of National Economy. After graduat-ing in 1990, he developed extensive business interests in Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Played a prominent role in the cultural affairs of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz-stani community in southern Kyrgyzstan and was reported to have invested some $6 million in educational initiatives in the region. The Kyrgyz authorities accused him of inciting violence in Jalal-Abad in May 2010; he denied the charges and fled abroad, first to Ukraine, then to Sweden, where he was granted asylum. He was tried in absentia in Kyrgyzstan; the court handed down a life sentence.
Azimbek Beknazarov: Born 1956, Jalal-Abad Province, Aksy region. Served in Soviet armed forces, grad-uated from Tashkent Law Technical College in 1984, and worked in legal depart-ments in various places (1991-99). In 2002, criticized President Akayev for giving up land to the Chinese (Sino-Kyrgyz Treaty); called for impeachment of Presi-dent. Arrested in January 2002 on charges of abuse of office; freed a few months later after public demonstrations in his defense.Member of Parliamentary Com-mittee on Legal Affairs in 2000-05. In September 2005 (under Bakiev), appointed Procurator General of Kyrgyzstan; April 2008, chairman of Asaba(“National Re-birth”) party; January 2008, launched anti-Bakiev “Revolutionary Movement of Kyrgyzstan”; December 2008,joined “United People’s Movement of Kyrgyz-stan”; 2010, became member of Interim Government.
Baktybek Beshimov: Born September 13, 1954, Osh region. Graduate of the Kyrgyz State University. President of the Osh State University 1992-98. Held senior positions in UNDP programs and Aga Khan Foundation regional initiatives.Briefly worked in the administration of Askar Akayev (1991-92), then became disenchanted and joined the opposition. Served as Kyrgyz ambassador in the Indian sub-continent in 2000-05. Supported the “Tulip Revolution”(2005), but soon became critical of Bakiev. Vice-President of the American University of Central Asia (2005-07). Leading member of the parliamentary opposition group of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (2007-09). In 2009, fearing for his safety, he left Kyrgyzstan to take up visiting posts in the United States.
Sooronbay Jeenbekov: Born November16,1958, in Kara-Kuldja district, Osh province. Graduated from the Kyrgyz Agricultural Institute in 1983. Thereafter employed in teaching and administrative positions, also in Communist Party work. Parliamentary deputy, with special responsibility for agrarian issues, in 1996-2000. Deputy parliamen-tary speaker 2000-2005. Appointed Minister for Agriculture, Water and Pro-cessing Industries in 2007 under Bakiev. Joined the Social Democratic Party. Appointed governor of Osh province in 2010, under the Interim Government. Elected Prime Minister of Kyrygzstan April 2016.Jeenbekov’s younger brother Asylbek (b. 1963), also a prominent politician, and parliamentary speaker since 2015, resigned when Sooronbai became prime minister, since family members were barred fromholding government posts simultaneously.
Murataly Ajy Jumanov: Born May1,1973, Osh province. In 1990-92 saw military service in armed forces of Kyrgyzstan, then entered Hazrat Usman madrassah in Osh province. In 1996-99, deputy qazy (Muslim cleric) in Osh province; in 1997-98, studied at Islamic Institute in Ufa (Russian Federation). In 2002, unanimously elected Mufti of Kyrgyzstan by the Council of Ulama; in 2003 graduated from Law Faculty of Osh State University. In April 2010, kidnapped and held captive for a few days (ac-cording to his own account, by gangsters); shortly thereafter he was removed from his post, apparently due to his links with Bakiev. Appointed Rector of the Islamic University, but in July 2010, at the age of 37, died of a heart attack.
Ednan Karabayev: Born January 1,1953, Talas city. Graduate of the Kyrgyz State University. Member of the Komsomoland active in Communist Party work (1981-90). In 1990-92 served in the Akayev administration. Minister of Foreign Affairs 1992-94; re-appointed under Bakiev in 2007-09.Travelled extensively during his ministerial terms of office. In 2012, he became special advisor to the Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan.
Feliks Kulov: Born October 19,1948, Frunze (Bishkek). Trained at advanced educational institutions of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs; held senior ranks in Soviet, then Kyrgyz security forces. In 1991-92, Minister of Internal Affairs in Kyrgyzstan and in 1992-93, Deputy President of Kyrgyzstan. In December 1993 resigned amid allegations of fraudulent dealings linked to launch of Kyrgyzstan’s national currency, but soon appointed head of the state administration of Chui Province. In 1997-98 served as Minister of National Security in Kyrgyzstan, and in 1998-99, Mayor of Bishkek. In 1999, founded Ar-Namys “Dignity”) party. In 2000, arrested on charges of abuse of office and incitement to violence; given custodial sentences by civil and military courts (7 and 10 years respectively); stripped of rank of Lieu-tenant General, property confiscated. Freed after 2005 “Tulip Revolution”and subsequently cleared of all criminal charges. September 2005 to January 2007 served as Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan under Bakiev. In February 2007 became leader of the opposition bloc “United Front for the Worthy Future of Kyrgyzstan.” Later that year charged with inciting anti-Bakiev protests. Post-2010, remained active in party politics, but mainly involved in raising finance for developmental projects.
Melisbek Myrzakmatov: Born April 18,1969, Osh Province. In 2007, joined Bakiev’s Ak Jolparty, held parliamentary seat until 2009. From January 2009 to December 2013, Mayor of Osh; unsuccessfully contested mayoral election in January 2014. Known as an out-spoken Kyrgyz nationalist.
Roza Otunbayeva: Born August 23, 1950, Frunze (now Bishkek).224Studied atMoscow State University; after graduation (1972), taught in the Kyrgyz State University. Political career began in 1981, when she became an official in the Communist Party; in 1986-89, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz SSR; in 1989-91, served in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and headed the Soviet delegation to UNESCO. In 1992 she became Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan; in 1992-2004, held prestigious diplomatic posts abroad. In December 2004, was one of the founders of the Ata-Jurt (“Fatherland”) party; in 2006, co-chair of Asabaparty (with Beknazarov).In 2008, she held a parliamentary seat on the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK) ticket, later became leader of the SDPK parliamentary group.On April7,2010, following demonstrations against Kurmanbek Bakiev, she was chosen by the opposition group to head the Interim Government. A week after the nationwide referendum on constitutional amend-ments on 27 June 2010, she was sworn in as President. When her term expired on December 31, 2011, she stood down, in accordance with constitutional procedure. Since then she has been engaged in inter-governmental humanitarian initiatives.
Temir Sariev: Born June 17, 1963, in the Chui province, he graduated from the economics facultyof the Kyrgyz State University in 1989. From 1991 to 2000, worked in the financial sector. In October 2006, he became one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Movement.In2007, the Kyrgyz authorities detained him on charges of smug-gling, but the case was soon dropped. After the ousting of Bakiev in April 2010, Sariev was appointed Minister of Finance Minister in the Interim Government. In December 2011, under the Atambayev administration, awarded the economics and anti-monopoly ministerial portfolio.He was elected PrimeMinster in April 2015; a year later, forced to resign because of alleged corruption.
Maksat Aji Toktomushev: Born August 9, 1973, Osh province. In 1991-95 followed courses in the local Agri-cultural Institute; concurrently, he studied Islamic law privately with local schol-ars. In 1998-2005, he studied Islamic law in Pakistan, at the Deobandi-oriented “Arabiya”Madrassah; on his return to Kyrgyzstan, in 2005-13 he taught at a local madrassah and served as imam and qazyat various mosques; unanimously elected Mufti in 2014.
