Waltz, Kenneth. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics". International Security, Vol.18, No.2 (1993): 44-79.

Waltz, Kenneth. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics". International Security, Vol.18, No.2 (1993): 44-79.

• Already in 1989 and 1990, senior officials in the US government longed for the predictability and stability of the Cold War, with its defined bipolarity based on power struggles and mutual assured destruction (44).
• A multipolar world is extremely stable, meaning that almost any event will still leave the system with multiple poles -- the sole event being the Second World War -- but prone to warfare. Conversely, a bipolar system is unstable, but more peaceful because fewer actors have to be accounted for (45).
• Neorealist theory would assume that actors in similar situations would behave in identical ways. For the large part, this is true about the USA and the USSR. Both countries pursued similar policies of armament and deterrence, faced the same security concerns, and participated in arms races (45-46).
• The interventionist behavior of the USA and Soviet Union was also similar, although this similarity was distorted by both the Western and Soviet media. The US defended client states in Vietnam, Korea, and China as the USSR did in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique (47).
• Despite the differing ideological content, both the USA and Soviet Union believed that their nations had the right to intervene in governance elsewhere and violate the sovereignty of nations to support 'just' strategic goals, either the spread of Liberalism or the spread of Communism (48-49).
• The author predicts that in the next decade, following the decline and dissolution of the Soviet Union, three more great powers may potentially rise -- Japan, China, and Germany or another Western European state (50, 62-63).
• At the present time, the author predicts that Russia will remain a great power since it has maintained the incredible military might of the Soviet Union and considerable international influence. As a result the world will remain bipolar unless Russia collapses or until another power rises (52).
• The author particularly believes that Japan could rejoin the great powers, as its mercantilist economic policies are bought it prosperity and international recognition since the 1970s (55). Doing so would require the end of mercantilism and the creation of an actual military force (57-58, 64-66).
• The immense economic and conventional military power of a United Germany make it a challenger on the world stage, which although smaller than Japan's economy has more export potential. The German government has also expressed a desire to handle Eastern Europe, outside of American influence (62-63).
• China also threatens to achieve great power status within a few decades, as its high rates of economic growth, nuclear arsenal and incredibly large population make it possible for the People's Republic to modernize its forces and grow to dominate its entire region save Japan (68).
• "[Great powers'] rank depends on how they score on a combination of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence" (50).
• Nuclear weaponry favors status-quo powers with smaller economies, like the Soviet Union, because it allows for an effective deterrence without requiring large military expenditure, which might otherwise bankrupt the nation (52).
• Nuclear weapons have severe limitations on use, however, as they cannot be effectively used as offensive or defensive weapons. Instead, they only serve to provide a security guarantee which imposes such a high potential cost that no state would think of threatening a nuclear-power's vital interests (53).
• The dominance of nuclear powers for the past half century has guaranteed the essential calm at the heart of politics, because the costs of war are too high. Wars may wage in the periphery, but any direct conflict is ruled out by the aweful power of nuclear weapons (54).
• Learning from the Japanese example, the author notes that free trade is not always the best policy for a nation. While free trade is beneficial to entirely unindustrialized countries and advanced industrial economies, developing nations must protect their infant industry through tariffs and protectionism (56-57).
• A theory has been advanced during the late Cold War that a decrease in military competition should also result in reduced care for one's competitive position based on economics, but this has not been true so far. Dr. Waltz supplies four reasons why this is not so (59):
• The international system continues to be anarchic, with states being unable to guarantee assistance outside of their own country and therefore concern about their relative position (59).
• Economic capacity, unlike military capacity, builds upon itself with increases in economic power furthering future increases. Therefore, relative gains are critical as they foretell larger future disparities (59-60).
• In the nuclear age where direct competition between powers in ruled out, competition for influence between great powers depends on economic influence and financial power. This makes economic power of strategic importance (60).
• The anarchic international system means that future concentrations of resources are desirable as stockpiles against the unknowable future. This means that economic power is necessary to deal with a changing security environment (60-61).
• A country which can become a great power choosing not to do so is a structural anomaly, one which will correct itself as the international expectations and reputations of Germany and Japan rise in tune with their economic power. Outside criticism of not doing enough in the world will likely propel these countries into great power status (66).
• The creation of a single federalized state out of Western Europe would instantly become a great power complete with robust nuclear capabilities. However, the creation of this state still faces significant obstacles to political or military cooperation considering its problems achieving economic cooperation (69-70).
• The major factors pushing Europe towards integration are the rising and threatening power of the USA, Japan or an independent Germany -- all of which could dominate Europe if the Europeans do not integrate (70).
• Despite predictions of America's coming decline, demographic trends indicate that Japan will be unable to effectively increase growth through enhanced productivity short of an economic breakthrough or the inclusion of more women in the workforce (71).
• A new world system featuring the US and Russia alongside Japan, Germany, or China will require all actors to learn older roles, specifically the United States which has never been a great power within a multipolar system (72).
• The multipolar world order following the collapse of the Soviet Union will lose its bipolarity, but will remain nuclear. Whereas a bipolar system with conventional weapons is stable compared to the multivariable nature of a multipolar system, the presence of nuclear weapons makes any state with second-strike capabilities an equal threat and reduces the chances of miscalculation even within a multipolar system (73).
• States engage in balancing behaviors, meaning that since the US is the most powerful player in the multipolar system, other powers will increasingly edge away from its influence, towards Russia, Germany, or Japan. The author predicts that NATO may not survive the coming geopolitical changes (75).
• NATO was originally created to serve as a protection against the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, but without the threat posed by the USSR, the organization will become irksome to America's European allies (75-76).
• The contemporary world system is a hegemony controlled by the United States where Russia is a declining power and Germany, Japan, and China are rising powers. However, in the nuclear world revisionist rising powers cannot use military force as easily, meaning contests of power will remain political and economic (76).
• Liberal institutionalists continually make claims about democratic peace, but history is actually replete with examples of democracies engaging in war, including the War of 1812, the American Civil War, and the First World War. The 'fact' that at least one belligerent was not a 'true' democracy is decided afterwards to protect the notion of democratic peace (78).