Tierney, Dominic. "The Ethics of Unwinnable War". In Moral Victories: The Ethics of Winning Wars, edited by Andrew Hom, Cian O'Driscoll, and Kurt Mills, 123-139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Tierney, Dominic. "The Ethics of Unwinnable War". In Moral Victories: The Ethics of Winning Wars, edited by Andrew Hom, Cian O'Driscoll, and Kurt Mills, 123-139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

• Just war theory is a Catholic tradition of thought which determines under what circumstances wars can be ethically fought. It is commonly referenced in modern politics and is taught at most American military academies. For a war to be just it must be started for just reasons, conduct during war must be just, and the post-war settlement must be just (124).
• A war can be jus ad bellum only when it is in self defense or to protect others from oppression. It must also be ordered by the competent and just political authority [a condition which precludes dictatorships from every fighting just wars], have a high probability of military success with limited casualties, be ordered only after all other options have been exhausted, and the overall benefits of the war must exceed the evils occasioned by conflict (124).
• A jus in bello war requires that prisoners-on-wars and civilians are treated humanely, that attacks should weight military value with potential collateral damage to civilians, and that cruel and unusual weapons or tactics are not used (125).
• To be jus post bellum, the post-conflict settlement must occur immediately as soon as the other side offers terms of peace. Only political and military leadership should be punished, not the general population. Additionally, peace terms must be proportionate to damages and support a post-conflict order which supports and fosters democracy, human rights, and future peace (125).
• The author asserts that wars are not clearly victories or defeats, but have a range of possible outcomes, with both victories or failures being partial rather than absolute or decisive (126).
• 'Fiascos' are limited wars by one country against another where the national survival of the aggressor is not at risk. They are defined by previously unexpected losses to the aggressor, making it impossible to achieve the limited gains at an acceptable cost. However, the cost of these wars is small enough that aggressors can theoretically fight forever (126).
• Of the wars since 1945 where the US has deployed over 50,000 troops abroad, the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan have become fiascos. The American goals in these wars -- the overthrow of the Communist government in North Korea, the preservation of an anti-Communist government in South Vietnam, the protection of democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan -- could not be achieved at acceptable costs (126-127).
• The author identifies a gap in contemporary scholarship on how just war theory applies to fiascos. This is likely because of the field's focus on jus ad bellum and jus in bello at the expense of scholarship on jus post bellum (127).
• Some aspects of just war theory do not apply to managing a fiasco. This is particularly for the conditions which typically govern jus ad bellum, since the war is already initiated and its sudden end brings military, economic, and political costs, as well as the possibility of violence against civilians or former collaborators (129).
• Military and political leaders should respond to fiascos by creating a narrower set of goals. Since according to the morals of jus ad bellum the amount of lives dedicated to the war should not be disproportionate to its gains, the failure to achieve the original goals should prompt the creation of more limited war goals which can be achieved at an acceptable cost (130).
• While the conditions for jus post bellum in winnable wars are the best peace possible, the just war goals in an unwinnable war are the best possible peace. Peace is the primary goal, but other goals should only be abandoned as much as is absolutely required to attain peace (130).
• The morality of continuing a fiasco is separate from the morality of starting that war in the first place. Although the just resolution of a fiasco does not make an unjust war just, the response to a fiasco is not necessarily unjust if the initial war was unjust (130-131, 137).
• In past fiascos, the US has embraced both just and unjust responses to wars. In the Korean War, when the cost of overthrowing the North Korean government became too costly, the US protected its core moral goal of defending South Korea by limiting its goals. The US failed to do this in Vietnam, failing to redefine its war aims during the Johnson administration, and failing to protect core moral goals during the Nixon administration (131). During the Iraq War, the US prioritized its domestic politics over the obligation to protect the Iraqi people, making its response unjust (132).
• This look at American history does not serve to inform American policy in Afghanistan, since the fundamental justness of the resolution to the Korean War was enabled by the justness of the war to defend South Korea, whereas wars in Vietnam and Iraq were not justly resolved because they had no just initial goal to defend (132).
• Even when initial just war aims cannot be defended, the abandonment of the war effort still cannot be justified because it may result in unnecessary casualties. Military resources should remain committed until the best possible peace is achieved at an acceptable cost (132-133).
• Within just war theory, it is acceptable to make deals with immoral people who have committed grave acts, when doing so will save lives and bring about peace. The alternative, war crimes tribunals, are impractical in most fiascos anyway since there is not a clear military leadership to indict (134).
• Violations of jus in bello can be justified in some extreme cases when they are the only possible military action and defeat would have catastrophic consequences, but this is essentially never the case in a fiasco. Therefore, jus in bello must be respected in fiascos, as its violation is both immoral and detrimental to counter-insurgency efforts (134-135).
• Obligation to obey jus post bellum do not end with the withdrawal from a fiasco, but also require the ethical treatment of refugees, veterans, collaborators, and others who may be in danger following defeat or negotiated settlement. It also requires doing one's best to uphold that order and make sure that the deal does not fall through (136).