Srinivasan, Krishnan, and Sreeradha Datta. "Bangladesh". In The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, edited by David Malone, C. Raja Mohan, Srinath Raghavan, 384-397. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Srinivasan, Krishnan, and Sreeradha Datta. "Bangladesh". In The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, edited by David Malone, C. Raja Mohan, Srinath Raghavan, 384-397. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

• Indian foreign policy in South Asia is limited in its goals. It seeks to establish positive relations in which India exchanges development aid or trade deals in return for the other country destroying or expelling any anti-Indian groups within the country, not significantly developing its military, remaining neutral on the Kashmir issue, and not forming strong ties with foreign powers or Pakistan (384).
• The territory of Bangladesh was first separated from West Bengal in 1905, when the British Raj split Bengal into two states along religious lines to weaken the Hindu Bengalis. The Muslims Bengalis liked being separated, as they had resented the domination of Hindus in government, land ownership, and the intelligentsia. Muslims Bengalis were active in demanding partition in 1947, causing large-scale violence in Kolkata and Noakhali, and leading to the partition of Bengal. The Bengalis were then dissatisfied by their domination by Punjabis and Urdu-speakers within Pakistan, successfully gaining independence as Bangladesh (384-385).
• Indian foreign policy towards Bangladesh was defined by the Indian role in liberating Bangladesh from Pakistan, backed by China and the USA, in 1971. For India, the war represented the victory of Indian secularism over Pakistani religious fundamentalism, and it expected Bangladesh to be grateful to India. This was largely true during Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's government from 1971 to 1975, which was heavily dependent on India for security assistance and humanitarian aid (385).
• Bangladeshi attitudes towards India soured after the military coup, supported by China, Pakistan, the USA, and Saudi Arabia, in 1975. The new government considered Islam to be essential to Bangladeshi identity, declaring it the state religion, and normalized relations with Pakistan. Bangladesh refused to be an Indian vassal and sought to ally with the USA and China in order to keep a distant relationship with India. In return, India ignored Bangladesh (385-386).
• Public opinions of Bangladesh in India are generally shaped by this period, with most viewing Bangladesh with a slight distaste associated with its connections to Pakistan and the presence of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. Only West Bengal has a generally positive impression, largely because of a shared culture and history (392-393).
• Indian relations with Bangladesh have been mercurial since the end of military rule in Bangladesh in 1990 depending on the ruling party in Dhaka. India supports the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's daughter Sheikh Hasina, which shares its values of socialism and secularism. It dislikes the Bangladesh National Party, which runs on specifically rejecting Indian domination, and thinks that Jamaat e Islam, which supports union with Pakistan, is the devil incarnate (386).
• Accordingly, Indian-Bangladeshi relations reached their nadir between 2001 and 2006, when a Nationalist-Jamaat e Islam coalition government took power. This government sponsored terrorist attacks within India, cracked down on Hindus and Christians in Bangladesh, and actively cooperated with Pakistani intelligence services (386).
• Relations between India and Bangladesh have warmed immensely since the election of the Awami League in 2006, and their reelection in 2014. Cooperation between India and Bangladesh has intensified since this period (386).
• Having a good relationship with Bangladesh is immensely important to India because it shows to the Muslim world that India is capable of having Muslim friends that it doesn't hate. India is thus deeply interested in maintaining friendly ties with Bangladesh (387).
• Bangladeshi foreign power is focused on the India-Pakistan rivalry in South Asia, a factor that explains why the two major parties are split between a pro-Indian and a pro-Pakistan foreign policy platform (387).
• Bangladesh does not maintain strong ties with outside powers. It respects the USA as a critical economic partner and the global superpower, but does not enjoy any special relationship. None of the European or Asian countries involved in development projects in Bangladesh enjoy a high public profile. China has a significant economic presence in Bangladesh and are expanding their influence, to India's chagrin, but do not currently have a strong relationship (387-388).
• Indian policy towards Bangladesh is defined by a limited number of core issues: border security, terrorism, illegal immigration, sharing rivers, Hindu rights in Bangladesh, and military security (388).
• The new Bangladesh government under Sheikh Hasina has greatly enhance cooperation with India on counter-terrorism, arresting many retired security officials responsible for supplying Indian terrorist groups with weapons, and cooperating with India to crack down on Islamist and leftist terrorists operating in Bangladesh (388-389).
• The India-Bangladesh border is long and porous, susceptible to both smuggling and illegal immigration. India has started building a fence, but it has been largely ineffective. Larger border disputes are moving towards resolution, although a bill to exchange enclaves has not yet been ratified by India. Bangladesh has also been unwilling to deter mass illegal immigration into India, which has seen over 10 million Bangladeshi Muslims settle illegally in India, angering many Indians (389-392).
• India and Bangladesh share virtually all of their rivers, but only have an agreement regarding the use of the Ganges. Bangladesh is sensitive to Indian plans to dam other rivers and water usage is often a source of major tension between the countries (390).
• With 10 million Hindus, Bangladesh is home to the second largest Hindu community. This minority is often subject to discrimination and violence, especially during periods of high sectarian tension across South Asia. Any violence against Hindus in Bangladesh degrades relations with India (391).
• Security cooperation between India and Bangladesh was restored in 2006 after a gap since the 1975 coup. Bangladesh is an active participant in UN peacekeeping missions, and India believes that this will promote a pro-India orientation and prevent the military from reasserting itself in politics (392).
• The Northeast of India has an intense dislike of Bangladesh because it has been most intensely affected by illegal immigration from Bangladesh, who have greatly increased the total number of Muslims resident in these states. They lobby the Indian government to take a harder stance towards Bangladesh and view it as a security threat (393).
• India and Bangladesh are some of each other's largest markets and are heavily interdependent. India has tried to enhance this trade by lowering taxes for Bangladesh and investing in Bangladeshi infrastructure (393-394). Bangladesh has tried to minimized these same connections by resisting the creation of interconnected infrastructure, viewing these projects as part of Indian imperialism (390).
• The authors argue that if India really wanted to enhance its relations with Bangladesh, it should resolve the areas of tension that affect both the Nationalist Party and the Awami League (396). Otherwise, India will remain the friend of the party that celebrates the 1971 independence and the enemy of the party that celebrates the 1947 independence (395).