Tuesday, January 12, 2021

March, Luke and C. Rommerskirchen. "Out of Left Field?: Explaining the Variable Electoral Success of European Radical Left Parties' Party Politics". Party Politics, vol.21, no.1 (2012): 40-53.

March, Luke and C. Rommerskirchen. "Out of Left Field?: Explaining the Variable Electoral Success of European Radical Left Parties' Party Politics". Party Politics, vol.21, no.1 (2012): 40-53.


  • The collapse of Communism in Europe between 1989 and 1991 has commonly been seen as the final death of radical left parties, however, evidence shows that following the end of the Cold War radical left parties have experiences the same resurgence as radical right parties (40).
    • This is likely riding of the trends of profound economic dissatisfaction in the West following the 2008 economic collapse and the imposition of German-style austerity measures through-out the continent (41).
  • 'Radical' left parties are distinguished from other left-wing groups by their rejection of underlying capitalist structures and values. They are all anti-system parties which do not want to preserve the status quo and want to change rather than govern the current system (41).
  • This study attempts to determine what external conditions have affected the rise of radical left parties in Europe since the fall of the Soviet Union. Three 'demand side' hypotheses are considered: Euroscepticism supports radical left parties; radical left parties are more successful in areas of economic distress; radical left parties are more successful in former communist states (43). Multiple 'supply side' hypotheses are also considered: radical left parties are more successful in permissive electoral systems; radical left parties are more successful when social democrats, greens, and far-right groups are weak; etc (44).
  • Full discussion of research methodology is available from page 43 to page 47.
  • The success of radical left parties was strongly co-related with previous presence in parliament. This was most clear with the continued success of radical left parties in former Communist states, but also the enduring presence of radical left parties in Western nations where they had 'broken into' parliament (47).
  • Although the date is not as clear, there is support within the data set for the conclusion that both high levels of Euroscepticism and bad economic situations positively effect the electoral success of radical left parties. Radical left parties play into fears of exploitation by neoliberalism and globalization, which increase as successful strategies among populations already distrustful of integration and capitalism (48).
  • The success of radical right-wing parties and of greens also negative affect the electoral success of radical left parties, as the anti-system vote is split between the groups. Greens tend to draw away voters who are economically marginalized, while radical right parties steal votes from Eurosceptic groups (48).
    • Radical left parties also have lower levels of support when the executive is controlled by the left, as a significant amount of their vote is anti-right protestors who are stronger as a group when the right is in power and prominent (48).
  • Voter turnout levels are not statistically significant as predictors for the success of radical left parties. Like most parties, the radical left electorate seems to be disciplined and stable, not as sudden phenomenon as some analysts have claimed (48).
  • This research indicates that radical left parties are a durable phenomenon that will not dissipate until the underlying economic factors it is associated with -- primarily Euroscepticism, unemployment, and economic inequality -- are dealt with. Current political parties need to develop strategies towards them, b/c they are not going anywhere soon (48).
  • Radical left parties are unlikely to make rapid break-throughs in areas where they do not have a strong tradition. Whereas radical left parties can mobilize in France, Greece, or Eastern Europe -- where Communists have a long history of political action -- they will struggle to rapidly gain power where they are not established parties, such as Austria or the UK (48).

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