Lemon, Edward. "Signs of improving relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan but tensions remain". Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 Oct. 2016.

Lemon, Edward. "Signs of improving relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan but tensions remain". Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 Oct. 2016.

• Uzbekistan began mining its border with Tajikistan in 1999, following concerns about the IMU hiding out in the territory. The Uzbekistani government introduced a visa regime for Tajikistani citizens in 2001.
• Much of the tension between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan comes from control over the water of the Amudaryo, which supplies much of southern Uzbekistan and supports a powerful agricultural export industry, especially in cotton. Tajikistani dams endanger this water flow. The point of current contention is the Rogun Dam, which is a major political goal for President Rahmon, but would cost the Uzbekistani economy an estimated $20 million.
• "After the government of Tajikistan gave the construction contract to Salini Impregilo in July, then Prime Minister Mirziyoyev sent a strongly-worded letter to his Tajik counterpart Kohir Rasulzoda. In the letter, he stated that the “Rogun hydropower plant is associated with the huge threats to the entire Central Asian region.” Clearly not all Tajik officials read the letter closely. A few days after it was sent, the Tajik Minister of Energy and Water Resources Usmon Usmonzoda claimed that Uzbekistan had no opposition to Rogun. The Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded with an August 1 statement declaring that, “never and under no circumstances,” would they support the project".
• There have been signs in the past few years that relations are improving between the republics, with President Karimov visiting Dushanbe (as part of an SCO summit) in 2014 and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr. Adxam Axmedbayev, visiting in June 2015, the first to do so since 1998.
• Following Mr. Karimov's death, the tone has become more conciliatory. At his speech at the UNGA this year, Mr. Kamilov requested a reopening of relations in the region, as opposed to standard claims chastising Tajikistan for contributing to the Aral Sea disaster.
• At the present moment, reconciliation between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan remains entirely rhetorical, as Uzbekistan has not taken any concrete measures to reestablish transport links or ease the visa regime for Tajikistanis travelling into Uzbekistan.
• "Tajikistan remains dependent on Uzbekistan for energy links and transport – all of Tajikistan’s rail connections with the outside world run through Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s government has used this position to pressurize its neighbor. In 2008, the government of Uzbekistan started seizing railroad cargoes bound for Tajikistan. In late 2011, all railway traffic was halted after what Uzbek officials called a 'terrorist' attack damaged the line near the border. Of the 16 border crossings between the countries, just two remain open".
• As a result of these damaged relations, bilateral trade was fallen from $300 million annually in 2008 to a paltry $2.1 million in 2014.
• Both republics have instead begun building national infrastructure. Uzbekistan completed the Pop-Angren railway, connecting the Farg'ona Valley the rest of Uzbekistan's rail network. Tajikistan has also tried, building a line from Qurg'on-Teppa to Dushanbe in August 2016, as the previous line ran through Uzbekistan.
• Uzbekistan has also put pressure of Dushanbe using its role as an energy supplier for the region. In 2009, Uzbekistan withdrew its national power network from the Soviet-era grid, and in 2012, it briefly stopped supplies of natural gas to Tajikistan to create political pressure.