Ganguly, Sumit, and Manjeet Pardesi. "Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy". India Review, Vol.8, No.1 (2009): 4-19.

Ganguly, Sumit, and Manjeet Pardesi. "Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign Policy". India Review, Vol.8, No.1 (2009): 4-19.

• Indian foreign policy can be organized into three basic phases: an early idealistic phase under Jawaharlal Nehru, a sceptic phase under a 'self-help' model after the Sino-Indian War in 1962, and a pragmatic and realist foreign policy adopted in 1991 after the end of the Cold War (4).
• The idealist foreign policy pursued by India from independence until 1962 did not originate out of naivety, but was a consciously idealistic foreign policy. Despite gaining independence at the beginning of the Cold War, India was relatively isolated from its effects due to a lack of interest in the country by both the USA and USSR. This gave India the freedom to pursue an unaligned foreign policy, strengthened by intentionally ignoring tensions with China (4-5).
• The experience of colonialism made Indian politicians sensitive to imperialism, and for this reason India sought to maneuver outside of the spheres of either Cold War power (5).
• Prime Minister Nehru feared that Indian involvement in the Cold War would drain Indian resources towards the conflict, whereas they should actually be directed towards internal development. On top of this, he possessed both some revulsion at Stalinist atrocities, balanced by admiration of the Soviet command economy, and a disdain for the USA, similar to that possessed by the British upper classes (5-6).
• Early Indian foreign policy was characterized by involvement in multilateral international institutions, especially peacekeeping operations, support for the non-aligned movement, and advocacy for decolonization (6).
• In pursuit of these policy goals, India sought to mediate between Cold War disputes, becoming an early advocate for the ban of nuclear tests in 1952 (6).
• India became heavily involved in the UN, contributing numerous peacekeepers during the Congo Crisis, and other international organizations. It was a member of the International Control Commission in Vietnam, alongside Canada and Poland, and was also a key member of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea (6).
• At the regional level, India sought to use the UN to influence developments in South Asia, referring the Kashmir dispute to the UN for arbitration. This strategy was an object failure, the UN failing to resolve either the Kashmir conflict nor the Indian-Portuguese dispute over Goa. These failure of international institutions led to a decline in Indian trust in institutions, leading Prime Minister Nehru to illegally invade Portugal in 1960 (7).
• Indian policy towards China was shaped by the five points of Panchsheel: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in one another’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (7).
• This idealist policy orientation led India to serious under-invest in military forces along the frontier with China. When tensions over the Himalayan border intensified in 1960, India was unable to deploy significant forces to the region, resulting in a decisive loss to Chinese forces in the October 1962 war (7).
• The defeat of the Indian army in the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the resultant loss of territory in the Himalayas marked a total overhaul of Indian foreign and security policy. This was mainly expressed in a massive armament program designed to give India a massive million-man army, as well as sizable air force and naval assets (8).
• The intensification of the Vietnam War saw the US lose essential all interest in India, leading the Soviets to expand their ties with India, marked by the Soviet role in brokering the 1966 Tashkent Declaration that ended the 1965 war between India and Pakistan (8).
• Pakistan sought to balance against growing Indian ties with the USSR, and the disengagement of America from South Asia, by expanding its ties with China. This move, combined with the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964, prompted a major debate in India about whether to abandon non-alignment and pursue nuclear weapons (8-9).
• India eventually decided to continue its policies of non-alignment and opposition to nuclear proliferation under Prime Minister Shahstri, but this determination was abandoned upon the election of Indira Gandhi, who sought to pursue nuclear weapons. On 1974, under Indira Gandhi, India successive tested its first nuclear weapon (9). The program was soon abandoned, however, as India faced still diplomatic and economic sanctions from the rest of the world (10).
• India used the USSR to balance against the threat of China and Pakistan, signing a 20-year pact with the Soviet Union in 1971. The protection afforded by this agreement allowed India to successful intervene in the war in East Pakistan, defeat Pakistani forces there, and help establish the nation of Bangladesh (9).
• India foreign policy under Indira Gandhi was defined by leadership of the Third World movement and continued opposition to colonialism, as well as a willing to use force to resolve disputes. In this first role, India maintained its strong opposition to South Africa, Portugal, and Israel (9).
• Indian victory over Pakistani in the 1971 war established Indian supremacy within South Asia, but it was unable to project this power onto the global stage. Economic growth in India was sluggish, generating a reticence to engage in the global economy that further fed into low rates of growth. This denied India both the ability and motivation to engage more with global politics (9-10).
• The exception to this was India's leadership of the Group of 77, a bloc of developing nations, during the 1973 oil crisis. This organization failed to accomplish anything meaningful, however (10).
• The unimportance of India to global politics was underscored by Soviet and American behavior in Afghanistan in 1979. America entered into a stronger alliance with General Zia-ul-Haq's government in Pakistan as a result, leaving India totally sidelined from the conflict and increasingly forced to depend on its relationship with the USSR for support, despite its opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (10-11).
• The collapse of the Soviet Union created an ideological vacuum within Indian foreign policy, with the previous strategy of non-alignment becoming meaningless following the end of the Cold War (11). India's new foreign policy was shaped by increased initiative finding export markets for its newly liberalized economy and trying to ease tensions with China (13-14).
• In 1991, India faced a massive fiscal crisis as a result of the First Persian Gulf War. The outbreak of war increased petroleum prices, draining the Indian treasury of foreign currency reserves, and forced the evacuation of 100,000 Indian immigrants from the Gulf back to India, greatly reducing the amount of foreign currency India received from remittances. The government, led by Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, took this as an opportunity to massively restructure the Indian economy and dismantle the quasi-socialist state through liberalization (11-12).
• India's attempt to assert itself internationally in the 1990s was challenged by the USA, now the world's sole superpower, due to President Clinton's strong opposition to the Indian nuclear weapons program. Any improvement in Indian-US relations was stifled by conflict over non-proliferation and lingering distrust on both sides (12-13).
• The Indian decision to test improved elements of its nuclear weapons program in 1995 were in response to US success in concluding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Fearing that the conclusion of the Treaty would mean it would be unable to conduct any tests afterwards, India tested a bomb right before the conclusion of negotiations (15).
• The international community was generally outraged at the 1995 Indian nuclear tests, but did not take any action. The administration of George W. Bush was considerably friendly with India than President Clinton had been, and promised India civilian nuclear cooperation. This ended India's diplomatic isolation and strengthened the US-Indian relationship (15).
• With the collapse of any meaningful non-aligned movement, India extended formal recognition to Israel, as the ideological basis for opposing the state as a colonial project no longer existed (13).
• During the 1990s, India sought to expand its influence in Southeast Asia. Whereas during the Cold War, these countries were considered US clients, liberal India viewed these countries as both potential export markets and additional allies against Chinese influence (13-14).
• Prime Minister Rao took steps to reduce tensions with China, committing themselves to a series of confidence building measures in 1993 and 1996. Although tension in the Himalayas was reduced, no actual progress was made in solving the Sino-Indian border dispute in Kashmir (14).
• Conflict with Pakistan continued and intensified during the 1990s, as the insurgency in Kashmir reignited in 1989. Pakistan was able to successful infiltrate the insurgent movement, bring many groups under their control and supply the rebels with significant amounts of support and weapons. The Indian response has been a violent counter-insurgency campaign (14).
• In order to ensure continued economic growth, create energy security, and resolve its internal security issues, India needs to have a proactive regional policy. At the current time, it does not possess one. Indian policy towards core issues, especially its strategy towards its relationships with Pakistan, China, and the USA, remains undecided (16).